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ABSTRACT
Despite numerous attempts to subject the use of pretext law enforcement
stops to Alaska Constitutional scrutiny, the issue has never been thoroughly
reviewed. Alaska courts currently allow pretext investigative stops so long as
a reasonable officer following permissible police practices could have made the
stop for the proffered reason. This is a minority position, inconsistent with
federal law which deems pretext motivations constitutionally irrelevant. It is
also far less protective of individual rights than an outright ban on officer
pretext. This reasonable officer standard, however, offers some advantages
over banning all types of pretext. This Article explores Alaska’s historical
treatment of pretext justifications, discusses why pretext is prominent in
police work, documents some of the leading arguments against pretext, and
frames the issue in light of an opportunity to balance competing policy
concerns. After considering precedent, reason, and policy, the authors urge
the Court of Appeals to continue use of the reasonable officer standard,
because it strikes the best balance between governmental, societal, and
individual concerns. Nevertheless, the Article argues that the standard should
be refined and suggests a workable test for determining when pretext stops
are outside acceptable police practices.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing legal issues facing the nation is the belief
that officers engage in racial profiling through the use of the pretext
stop.1 If the controversy surrounding Arizona’s 2010 legislative attempts
to curb illegal immigration demonstrated anything, it is the prevalence
of the perception that police target minority racial and ethnic groups.
Despite provisions in Arizona Senate Bill 1070 that expressly banned
targeting individuals solely on the basis of their apparent ancestry,2
many believed the new legislation shielded profiling from review and
even encouraged it.3 Perhaps their fears were justified. Recently,
the
Southern District of New York ruled that the New York Police
Department’s “Stop and Frisk” policy allows officers to racially

1. See Michael L. Birzer & Gwynne Harris Birzer, Race Matters: A Critical
Look at Racial Profiling, It’s a Matter for the Courts, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 643, 643 (2006)
(noting the United States Commission on Civil Rights’ (2000) declaration that
racial profiling remains the highest priority, recommending legislation to
prosecute violators, and increasing efforts to rid policing of this practice); see also
Ending Racial Profiling in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties
Union) [hereinafter Ending Racial Profiling Hearing] (detailing the ongoing
presence of racial profiling in America and urging the passage of the End Racial
Profiling Act of 2011).
2. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (“For any lawful stop, detention or arrest
made by a law enforcement official . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that
the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the
immigration status of the person. . . . A law enforcement official . . . may not
consider race, color or national origin in implementing the requirements of this
subsection except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona
Constitution.”).
3. See, e.g., Christina Boomer, State Law Professor Claims S.B. 1070 ‘Expressly
Authorizes
Racial
Profiling,’
ABC15.COM
(July
26,
2010),
http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/state/state-law-professor-claims-sb1070%27expressly-authorizes-racial-profiling%27 (discussing University of Arizona
law professor Gabriel Jackson Chin’s belief that the bill “doesn’t just create a
probability of racial profiling, but authorizes it”). See also Gerry Harrington,
Holder: DOJ to Ensure No Ariz. Profiling, UPI (July 8, 2012, 1:21 AM),
http://www.policeone.com/border-patrol/articles/5816235-Holder-DOJ-toensure-no-Ariz-profiling. Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the nation’s
largest Hispanic citizens’ organization La Razza and said he remained “seriously
concerned” by the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision to let a key
provision of S.B. 1070 stand that instructs police to check the immigration status
of those lawfully detained if they have reasonable suspicion they are illegal
immigrants. Id. He stated, “[w]e’ll work to ensure, as the court affirmed, that
such laws cannot be seen as a license to engage in racial profiling.” Id.
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stereotype the individuals they stop and frisk.4 The controversies
surrounding these policies in Arizona and New York call attention to a
widespread belief that law enforcement officers do not equally enforce
the laws of the land on all groups of citizens.5 For many commentators,
pretext stops are one of the primary ways in which police engage in
discriminatory enforcement of the law.
Pretext stops occur when police officers temporarily detain an
individual for particular reasons, but then use that stop to search or
question him in relation to offenses for which the officers have neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. These stops are “pretextual” in
the sense that the purported reason for the stop is not the real reason for
which the officers are acting.6 Using pretext legal justifications is a
common and efficient tool that allows officers to engage in
investigations that they would not otherwise be justified in performing.7

4. See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS), 2013 WL 4046209,
at *73–74 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (“Whether through the use of a facially
neutral policy applied in a discriminatory manner, or through express racial
profiling, targeting young black and Hispanic men for stops based on the
alleged criminal conduct of other young black or Hispanic men violates bedrock
principles of equality.”); see also Joseph Goldstein, Recording Points to Race Factor
in Stops by New York Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/nyregion/bronx-officers-recordingsuggests-race-is-factor-in-stops.html?%20Joseph (describing recent efforts to
prove the existence of a policy and practice of racial profiling in New York
through a class action suit against the city, the police department, and others).
Numerous amicus briefs were filed arguing that racial profiling continues to
exist and fosters a culture of racial hostility. Id. This Article primarily addresses
traffic-related pretext stops, but not “Stop-and-Frisk” type policies, such as those
adopted by the NYPD. Alaska’s cold temperatures make traffic encounters a
frequent source of pretext in its case law.
5. See, e.g., Laura W. Murphy, Time for Obama and Holder to Truly End Racial
Profiling by Law Enforcement, ACLU (Dec. 21, 2012, 12:18 PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/time-obama-and-holder-truly-endracial-profiling-law-enforcement (arguing that the Obama administration’s
failure to revise Justice Department policies permits the continued use of racial
profiling and stereotyping by federal law enforcement agencies); Ending Racial
Profiling Hearing, supra note 1 (detailing the ongoing presence of racial profiling
in America and urging the passage of the End Racial Profiling Act of 2011); I.
Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (citation omitted).
6. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990) (defining pretext as the
“ostensible reason or motive assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real
reason or motive; false appearance, pretense”). As Shardul Desai explains,
“applied to searches and seizures, pretext occurs when police use legal
justifications to make stops or conduct searches for unrelated crimes for which
they do not have the independent reasonable suspicion necessary to support the
stop.” Shardul Desai, Pretextual Searches and Seizures: Alaska’s Failure to Adopt a
Standard, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 235, 236 (Dec. 2006) (citation omitted).
7. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and
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For example, an officer who wants to question a driver about an
unrelated crime can use stopping the driver for a minor traffic violation
as a pretext for asking about the other crime.8 Similarly, an officer who
stops and frisks persons during street encounters is sometimes using
those stops as pretexts for investigating other crimes.9 While some
believe these pretextual stops are a useful law enforcement tool,10 others
argue that pretext violates constitutional standards for intrusion into the
affairs of citizens11 and shields race-based policing from discovery.12
Alaska has not yet confronted the issue of pretext stops in the same
public, controversial manner in which Arizona and New York City have.
Nevertheless, this Article recommends a proactive consideration of this
issue in order to highlight legal alternatives to the practice and avoid
any appearance of providing “legal cover” for discriminatory conduct.
Toward this end, we examine pretext stops from three perspectives:
precedent, reason, and policy.
This Article highlights the need for Alaska to avoid following
precedent that has not been thoroughly explained or deemed
constitutional. Toward this end, it examines the development of Alaska
law on pretext investigations in the light of how courts in other states
have addressed the issue. The Article also seeks to enrich the discussion
by adding a law enforcement perspective to what has largely been a

Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey
Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2000) (discussing the use of
pretext stops for traffic violations when police officers are “in fact motivated by
the desire to obtain evidence of other crimes”); see also Desai, supra note 6, at 236
(outlining common motivations for the use of pretext).
8. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7.
9. See Goldstein, supra note 4 (discussing the use of pretext in the NYPD’s
stop and frisk policy).
10. Richard Cohen, The Invasive Police Strategy that Pacified New York City,
WASH. POST (May 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/didnew-york-citys-stop-and-frisk-save-5600-lives/2012/05/14/gIQAUv2kPU_story
.html (discussing the way Mayor Bloomberg, of New York City, defends stop
and frisk procedures).
11. See, e.g., Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 838–42 (Wash. 1999) (en banc)
(noting that pretext allows officers to circumvent the generally accepted rule that
police seizures must be reasonable, which requires a warrant or a warrant
exception); State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
“pretextual traffic stops are not constitutionally reasonable”).
12. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 726 (“[T]he Whren Court
validated one of the most common methods by which racial profiles are put into
effect—the pretext stop.”); Capers, supra note 5, at 12 (“Here, the fact that our
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence now fosters an atmosphere in which
racial profiling is often unremarkable and juridically tolerated, and in which
racial minorities perceive themselves to be second-class citizens, evidences the
current Court’s retreat from concerns about equality and citizenship.”); Birzer &
Birzer, supra note 1, at 648 (critiquing continued allowance of pretext stops).
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discussion amongst lawyers. This added perspective emphasizes why
pretext justifications are prevalent in police work and how external
influences on officers ensure their continued use. We encourage Alaska
to adopt a standard that allows some unavoidable and beneficial forms
of pretext while protecting against illegitimate forms such as racial
profiling. Such a policy is grounded in reason and reality, while
addressing the fears of many minorities regarding the dangers of
pretext. If applied correctly, the reasonable officer standard is such a
standard.
However, Alaska courts employ the reasonable officer standard
differently than other jurisdictions.13 Alaska courts use it to define
whether pretext motivations exist.14 Other jurisdictions acknowledge
from the outset that pretext is present, and instead use the standard to
decide whether the pretext will be permitted.15 Alaska’s current
application of the standard is problematic because it does not
adequately address whether an officer’s primary actual reason(s) for the
stop are such that they eclipse the relevance of whether a reasonable
officer would have acted on the observed infractions alone. For example,
sometimes an officer’s actual reasons are so illegitimate that the question
of whether a reasonable officer might have done something similar is
rendered moot. Alaska courts need to articulate a workable test for
determining when police actions driven by a complex mixture of
pretextual and other reasons are, on the whole, consistent with
reasonable police practice or not.
Section One discusses legal standards governing pretext
motivations and shows that Alaska courts have been reluctant to
address whether pretext stops are allowed under the Alaska
Constitution. This review of Alaska’s legal precedents highlights the
inherent conflict, analyzed in Section Four, between the high value
society places on individual autonomy and freedom from government
intrusion, and the similarly high value it places on public safety and
social responsibility. Alaska courts often decide cases involving these
competing values in favor of the former.16

13. See infra discussion Part I.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734–36 (Alaska 1979) (imposing
greater limitations on jailhouse booking searches than the federal courts because
of greater protections of the Alaska Constitution); State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408,
416 (Alaska 1979) (limiting the permissible scope of inventory searches of
vehicles beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment); State v. Glass, 583
P.2d 872, 878–80 (Alaska 1978) (refusing to follow federal law allowing the
surreptitious and warrantless recording of conversations); Ellison v. State, 383
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This preference for individual autonomy closely relates to
arguments presented in Section Two, which examines how law
enforcement (including the legislative branch, the executive branch, and
various levels of law enforcement bureaucracy) balances concerns for
individual autonomy and public safety. Police officers, in particular, are
often forced to use creative strategies that attempt to bridge the gap
between the demand to protect the public and the strict procedural
requirements imposed by the courts. This fact places courts in the
position of deciding when an officer’s use of pretext is a reasonable
police practice because it effectively balances competing interests.
Recognizing that this balancing of interests is an unavoidable aspect of
police work, courts should adopt a standard that allows for reasonable
uses of pretext, but imposes sufficient constraints to allow them to
adjudicate effectively cases where pretext stops were truly
discriminatory.
Section Three examines the arguments against allowing pretext
stops. While most jurisdictions allow pretext stops,17 there is a large
body of literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v.
United States,18 which allowed pretext stops, and an even larger body of
research suggesting that racial profiling occurs under the guise of these
stops.19 This section highlights the two most prominent arguments
against allowing pretext stops and demonstrates the need for Alaska to
place some limits on its use.
Section Four argues that courts will be able to devise an adequate
approach to pretext stops if they examine the issue in the light of
precedent, reason, and public policy. In light of this precedent, we
encourage Alaska to adopt a holistic rule for pretext stops based on
reason and policy rather than precedent alone. Such an approach offers

P.2d 716, 718–20 (Alaska 1963) (reasoning that automobiles are protected by a
reasonable expectation of privacy from warrantless searches because the Alaska
Constitution protects “other property”). Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
49 (1970) (allowing the warrantless search of a vehicle in part because of the
reduced expectations of privacy people have in their automobiles).
17. See People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 & n.1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that more than 40 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
federal objective standard, and only one state has refused to adopt the federal
standard on state constitutional grounds); see also Abramovsky & Edelstein,
supra note 7, at 733 & n.60, 738 & n.98 (noting that the only state high court to
reject Whren is the Washington Supreme Court and cataloguing a list of
jurisdictions that have adopted Whren’s objective standard). But note that New
Mexico has also recently declined to follow Whren. See State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d
143, 151–55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting as unconstitutional the use of
pretextual stops).
18. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
19. See Goldstein, supra note 4. See also infra discussion Parts II and III.
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the best chance of adequately addressing competing concerns raised in
this contentious debate.
The final section provides recommendations for analyzing pretext
stops that balance precedent, reason, and policy and conform to
constitutional standards. We present these recommendations as a path
toward devising an alternative to the Alaska Court of Appeals’ use of
the reasonable officer standard articulated in Nease v. State.20 Our
alternative approach does not reject this standard outright, but
recommends a different way of understanding it. We believe it is time
for the court to survey the landscape and see if this is the appropriate
standard. If it is, the court needs to elaborate and defend it. We offer a
way in which this might be done.

I.

LEGAL PRECEDENT GOVERNING PRETEXT STOPS

Three legal standards have emerged to govern the permissibility of
pretext stops by law enforcement officers. Varying by jurisdiction, courts
have applied either a subjective, objective, or hybrid reasonable officer
standard.21 The objective standard makes an officer’s subjective
motivations immaterial. Using this standard, a court examines whether
there was some legal justification which could have allowed the stop or
search to occur.22 Under this standard, pretext motivations are
permissible in that they do not affect the legality of the stop so long as a
separate and lawful reason for the stop or search exists.23
Courts employing the subjective standard focus on the officer’s true
motivation to stop and investigate.24 If the officer’s actual motivation
lacks a lawful justification for a stop, the subsequent search is
unconstitutional.25 Under this standard, all pretext stops are unlawful.26
The reasonable officer standard requires courts to follow a more

20. 105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
21. See Desai, supra note 6, at 243–46 (discussing the nuances of these three
standards).
22. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting the notion
that the constitutionality of traffic stops could turn on the subjective motivations
of individual officers).
23. See, e.g., id. at 812–13 (1996) (reasoning that lawful conduct by officers
will not be rendered invalid simply on the basis of ulterior motives).
24. See Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (Wash. 1999) (“when determining
whether a given stop is pretextual, the court should consider the totality of the
circumstances, including . . . the subjective intent of the officer”).
25. See id. at 842 (holding that pretext stops violate Washington’s
constitution).
26. See, e.g., Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837–42; People v. Dickson, 690 N.Y.S.2d 394,
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (maintaining that pretextual stops are prohibited in
New York).
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stringent version of the objective approach by allowing officers to
entertain pretext motivations, but only to the extent that the stop could
have occurred under established police practice.27
A.

The Federal Objective Standard for Pretext Stops

In 1996, the United States Supreme Court created a bright-line rule
allowing pretext traffic stops by a unanimous decision in Whren v.
United States.28 According to the Whren court, traffic stops are valid
regardless of the subjective motivations of the investigating officers, so
long as there is probable cause that some traffic violation has occurred
which would allow a stop for that violation.29 This is the objective
standard referred to above.
In Whren, undercover narcotics detectives were patrolling a known
drug area when they noticed a suspicious vehicle driven by two young
black males they believed might be carrying drugs.30 The vehicle was
stopped at a stop sign for an unusually long period, had temporary
plates, and the driver was seen looking at the lap of the passenger.31
When the police turned around, the truck turned without signaling and
sped off.32 The officers pulled over the vehicle based on this observed
traffic violation, and when they approached the car they saw two bags
of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands, for which he was later prosecuted.33
Whren argued that the stop for the observed traffic violations was
merely a pretext to investigate the vehicle for drug dealing, for which
the officers lacked independent evidence needed to stop and
investigate.34 He contended that this stop was merely pretextual and

27. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[C]ourts should inquire whether a reasonable officer ‘would have’ made the
stop anyway, apart from his suspicions about other more serious criminal
activity.”); Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he fact
that a police officer may have an ulterior motive for enforcing the law is
irrelevant . . . unless . . . this ulterior motive prompted the officer to depart from
reasonable police practice.”).
28. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
29. See id. Whren did not expressly extend this to investigatory traffic stops
based on just reasonable suspicion, but logic suggests the same rule would
apply.
30. Id. at 808.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 808–09. It was not argued that this stop was based on any
suspicions raised by the officer’s observations. The stop was argued permissible
based on the observed traffic violations. Id.
34. Id. at 809.
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thus unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds.35 Whren argued
that the extent of automobile regulations renders it nearly impossible to
comply with all traffic and safety rules. This creates a situation where
officers will almost “invariably be able to catch any given motorist on a
technical violation.”36 He argued that permitting pretext stops based
only on probable cause of the observed traffic violation would create the
temptation to inappropriately use traffic stops as a means of
investigating other violations for which there was no probable cause or
articulable suspicion.37 He claimed that this could lead to stops based on
impermissible factors, such as race.38
Whren advocated for a rule that would only allow such a stop if a
police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the
reason given.39 He argued it was unreasonable for plain clothes vice
officers in an unmarked car to enforce this minor traffic violation when
police regulations only permitted such vehicles to enforce traffic laws if
the violation was grave enough to pose an immediate safety threat to
others.40
The Supreme Court noted it had previously prohibited the use of
pretext investigative agendas in the context of inventory searches41 and
administrative searches,42 but emphasized the limited breadth of those
holdings. The Court distinguished these rulings from the facts of the
Whren case, as they addressed only “the validity of a search conducted
in the absence of probable cause” in the context of inventory and
administrative searches.43 In contrast, Whren was a passenger in a
vehicle observed violating a traffic law.44 According to the Court, when
courts find pretext motivations prohibited, the Court did not intend to
endorse the idea that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct
justified by probable cause.
By contrast when probable cause of a violation existed, the Court
held that the subjective intentions of officers had no bearing on Fourth
Amendment analysis.45 Indeed, the Court had a track record of not

35. Id. at 810.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. This standard is referred to as the “reasonable officer standard.”
40. Id. at 815.
41. Id. at 811 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) and Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)).
42. Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716–17 & n.27 (1987)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 808, 812–13. In United States v. Villamonte–Marquez, the Court held
that an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs agents was
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looking at the subjective intent of officers in both Fourth46 and Fifth47
Amendment cases where other circumstances create an opportunity for
legal action. For example, in New York v. Quarles, the United States
Supreme Court created the public safety exception to the Miranda
warning requirement and held this exception was available regardless of
the subjective motivations of the officers at the time the exception
applied.48
In Whren, the Court refused to apply a “reasonable officer
standard.”49 This standard, adopted at that time by the Ninth and
not invalid “because the Customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana
State Policeman, and were following an informant’s tip that a vessel in the ship
channel was thought to be carrying marijuana.” 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). The
Court dismissed any idea that an ulterior motive might serve to remove the
agents’ legal justification for their actions. Id. at 588. In United States v. Robinson,
the Court held that a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid
because it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search,” and that a lawful postarrest search of the person would not be invalid by the fact that it was not
motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches. 414 U.S. 218,
221 n.1 (1973). See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (observing
that the lawfulness of a search does not turn on the presence of an evidentiary
purpose). In Scott v. United States, the Court rejected the argument that wiretap
evidence should be excluded because the agents controlling the tap failed to
make any effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized
acquisitions be minimized. 436 U.S. 128, 136–38 (1978). In response the Court
said “[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal
or unconstitutional.” Id. at 136. According to Robinson, “the fact that the officer
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action.” Id. at 138.
46. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
47. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
48. Id. (“On these facts there is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement
that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted
into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not depend upon the
motivation of the individual officers involved. . . . Undoubtedly most police
officers, if placed in Officer Kraft’s position, would act out of a host of different,
instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety of
others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the
suspect.”)
49. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814–15 (citation omitted) (“Instead of asking whether
the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have
us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to
believe that the officer had the proper state of mind. . . . Indeed, it seems to us
somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb
the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a
‘reasonable officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.
While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide
objective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the
hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable—an exercise that might be
called virtual subjectivity. Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they
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Eleventh Circuits, did not expressly look at officer motivation, but rather
focused on whether the officer had acted outside of what reasonable
officers following normal police procedures would have done once the
traffic violation was observed.50 Under this approach, if the police action
was deemed to be taken in good faith and within the scope of reasonable
police practice, then it is not pretextual. If it was not so taken, then it is
considered an unlawful form of pretext.51
Given the speculative nature of ascertaining underlying
motivations as well as the degree to which police standards vary across
jurisdictions, the Court was hesitant to adopt the reasonable officer
standard.52 Such a standard would vary widely across the rules of
different jurisdictions and involve judicial speculation about the
hypothetical motives of a hypothetical officer—”an exercise that might
be called virtual subjectivity.”53
Instead, the Court adopted the purely objective, bright-line
approach that pretext searches and seizures are valid so long as there is
probable cause of some violation that could justify the initial stop.54 The
logic of the Whren decision lays the foundation for extending the
objective standard to investigative traffic stops when based on an
articulated suspicion of a violation, as these temporary investigative
detentions are considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.55
One author has summarized the two standards discussed in Whren

could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time
to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth
Amendment are so variable . . . .”).
50. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that “in determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the
proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in
the absence of the illegitimate motivation”); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d
472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a search is valid “even if the searching officer
had an investigatory motive, as long as the officer would have conducted the
search in question anyway pursuant to police inventory practices”).
51. See Smith, 799 F.2d at 708 (finding officer’s “hunch” was not a lawful
form of pretext and declining to uphold the stop); Cannon, 29 F.3d at 476 (finding
stopping a car because the driver was driving with a suspended license was
lawful).
52. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814–15. For example, in this particular case, Whren
argued that a reasonable officer would not have made this stop because police
regulations permit undercover officers to enforce traffic laws “only in the case of
a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.”
Id. at 815 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original).
53. Id. at 815.
54. Id. at 818–19.
55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (discussing the determination of
reasonableness in police searches).
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by calling the objective standard the “could test” and the reasonable
officer standard the “would test.”56 The objective standard allows the
court to support officers’ actions if, given the facts and circumstances, an
officer could lawfully perform the contested action, notwithstanding
having a pretext motive. The reasonable officer standard only protects
those actions where the facts and circumstances would lead reasonable
officers to act, despite having other pretext motives as well.
B.

Refusing to Follow Whren: The Subjective and Reasonable
Officer Standards

While most states have adopted the objective approach announced
in Whren,57 several states have refused to follow that trend based on
their own state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.58 In Ladson v. State,59 the Washington Supreme Court held
that pretext traffic stops violate Article I, Section 7 of the Washington
Constitution.
In Ladson, officers on gang patrol noticed a vehicle driven by
Richard Fogle with a passenger, Thomas Ladson.60 The officers had
heard rumors that Fogle was involved with drugs.61 Based on this
suspicion, and the desire to investigate further, the officers tailed Fogle’s
vehicle looking for a legal justification to stop the car.62 After some time,
the officers pulled over the vehicle on the grounds that the license plates
had expired.63 When it was discovered that Fogle was driving on a
suspended driver’s license, they arrested him, ordered Ladson out of the
car, and performed a full search incident to arrest of the passenger
compartment.64 Inside Ladson’s coat, which was lying on the passenger
seat, the officers found a pistol, marijuana, and $600 cash. 65 Ladson was
charged with possession of a stolen firearm and drug possession with
intent to distribute.66

56. Celia G. Gamrath, The Law of Pretext Stops Since Whren v. United States,
85 ILL. B.J. 488, 489 (1997).
57. See sources cited supra note 17.
58. See Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); State v.
Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006); State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 151–
55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt the Whren standard).
59. 979 P.2d at 842–43.
60. Id. at 836.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Ladson moved to suppress the evidence arguing it was obtained
during an unconstitutional pretext traffic stop.67 The officers candidly
admitted it was standard practice to look for traffic violations to enable
them to investigate other crimes, and that the reason they followed and
pulled over this vehicle was their desire to investigate other crimes.68
The trial court suppressed the evidence and held that pretext stops by
law enforcement officers violate the Washington Constitution.69 The
State appealed in light of the recently decided Whren v. United States.70
On appeal, Ladson argued that Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth
Amendment in the area of pretext stops and renders them
unconstitutional.71 This provision reads “[n]o person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”72
The Washington court acknowledged that the essence of every pretext
traffic stop is a situation where police pull over a citizen, not to enforce
the traffic code, but rather to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated
to the driving.73 The reasonable suspicion to investigate the unrelated
crime is missing.74 Reviewing applicable state search and seizure
standards, the court noted that even routine traffic stops are a seizure
that must be reasonable, and that pretext stops do not fall within one of
Washington’s “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions to the warrant
requirement.75 Washington’s constitutional search and seizure provision
is designed to guard against “‘unreasonable search and seizure, made
without probable cause.’”76 The Washington court believed pretext stops
violated this standard. The Ladson majority stated:
The problem with a pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search
or seizure which cannot be constitutionally justified for its true
reason (i.e., speculative criminal investigation), but only for
some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code) which is at once
lawfully sufficient but not the real reason. Pretext is therefore a

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
73. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 836.
74. Id. at 837–38.
75. Id. (quoting State v. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996)). Exceptions
to the warrant requirement fall into several broad categories: consent, exigent
circumstances, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, plain view, and
Terry investigative stops. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d at 568.
76. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Fields, 530
P.2d 284, 286 (Wash. 1975)).
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triumph of form over substance; a triumph of expediency at the
expense of reason. But it is against the standard of
reasonableness which our constitution measures exceptions to
the general rule, which forbids search or seizure absent a
warrant. Pretext is result without reason.77
Accordingly, the court refused to break from its historical disapproval of
police pretext in Washington case law.78
The Ladson dissent argued the search was not justified by the
pretextual stop, but by the independent grounds discovered at the
stop.79 The majority countered that such a conclusion presumes that the
initial pretext stop was justified—the very question to be decided.80 The
majority declined to follow Whren and held that Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution forbids use of pretext as a justification for a
warrantless search or seizure, but rather requires the court to look
beyond the formal justification for the stop to the actual one.81
Ultimately, in the case of pretext stops the actual reason for the stop will
be inherently insufficient, otherwise the pretext motivation would have
been unnecessary.82 Summarizing its holding, the court stated:
Once again, warrants are the rule while exceptions are
narrowly tailored to meet the reasonable necessity of the
common law ground which provides the authority of law to
dispense with the warrant requirement. Pretext is no substitute
for reason. Thus, this and other pretextual inventory search
cases prove the rule that recognized exceptions to the warrant

77. Id.
78. Id. at 838–42. On multiple occasions, the Washington Supreme Court has
held pretext searches and seizures are unlawful. See City of Seattle v. McCready,
868 P.2d 134, 140 (Wash. 1994) (affirming that the government cannot disturb an
individual’s private affairs without a legally valid warrant based upon probable
cause); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (Wash. 1988) (prohibiting
pretext stops under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution,
reasoning that such stops lack the articulable suspicion mandated in warrantless
searches); State v. Michaels, 374 P.2d 989, 993–94 (Wash. 1962) (adopting a strict
no-pretext rule where defendant was stopped and arrested for failing to use a
turn signal and was searched incident to arrest).
79. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 845.
80. Id. at 839 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). “Such is the
dissent’s ultimate dilemma: How [sic] can this court articulate an exception to
the warrant requirement based upon reasonable necessity when the warrant is
avoided, not for a reason which would justify the warrantless investigatory stop,
but upon a pretext of form lacking connection to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity which would justify the exception to the warrant
requirement in the first place?” Id. at 838–39.
81. Id. at 842.
82. Id.
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requirement are limited by the reason which called them into
existence, not a pro forma device, as the dissent would have it,
to undermine the “authority of law” warrant requirement
enshrined in our state constitution.83
Based on its constitution, Washington has decided it is an abuse of
police discretion to conduct warrantless searches under the guise of
recognized warrant exceptions if the reason for activating those
exceptions is something other than one of the legitimate government
interests necessary for deviation from the warrant standard in the first
place.84 In other words, where the actual motivation for the stop or
search does not match the reason for deviating from the general rule
requiring probable cause and a warrant, the stop and search is then
unreasonable under the Washington Constitution. As applied in the
State of Washington, the subjective standard proscribes the use of
pretext stops, and requires the court to ascertain the officer’s actual
motivation.
Similarly, New Mexico has rejected Whren’s objective standard and
moved toward the reasonable officer standard. In State v. Ochoa,85 an
undercover drug detective was watching a suspected drug trafficking
residence when he observed an unfamiliar vehicle.86 Wanting to search
the vehicle, he observed the vehicle leaving the residence and he radioed
a patrol officer to stop it because the driver was seen not wearing his
seatbelt.87 After following the vehicle for thirteen blocks, but not
personally witnessing the seatbelt violation, the patrol officer stopped
the vehicle based on the reported observation of the drug detective.88
The driver was arrested for having outstanding warrants, and when the
drug detective arrived, he received consent to search the car and located
some drugs and a gun.89 The driver moved to suppress this evidence as
fruit of a pretext traffic stop in violation of the state constitution.90
Specifically, he argued the state constitution provides a “distinctive,
extra layer of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
involving automobiles that is unavailable at the federal level,” and this

83. Id. at 841.
84. Id.
85. 206 P.3d 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). See also State v. Gonzales, 257 P.3d
894, 896, 898–99 (N.M. 2011) (adopting the appellate court’s reasonable officer
test in Ochoa and affirming that pretext stops are unconstitutional in New
Mexico).
86. Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 147.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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requires meaningful review of all evidence about the reasonableness of
the officer’s conduct.91
The appellate court noted that there were many criticisms of
Whren’s legal reasoning, policy choices, and consequences.92 After
agreeing with these critiques of Whren, the court declined to adopt the
objective test and held that pretextual traffic stops violate the New
Mexico Constitution.93 Instead, the court adopted a reasonable officer
standard, a test which rejects unreasonable pretext stops, 94 later
described in detail in Section Four of this Article. This test defines
“unreasonable” pretext stops as “purely pretext” stops.95 Applying this
standard, the defendant was able to establish a presumption of unlawful
pretext that the State was unable to rebut.96
Washington and New Mexico both refused to follow Whren by
subjecting officer pretext to a more thorough judicial scrutiny. Each state
has rejected police officers’ use of minor traffic violations to skirt state
constitutional limits on police intrusion. Each of the cases discussed
above provide good reasons for Alaska courts to consider when they
address whether pretext searches are valid under its state constitution.
C.

Alaska’s Inconsistent Approach to Pretext

Alaska courts have inconsistently applied the subjective, objective,
and reasonable officer standards to pretext vehicle stops. Like other state
and federal courts, the shift towards allowing pretext stops emerged
during the 1980s and 1990s when the United States Supreme Court
began to place greater emphasis on the need for crime control
strategies.97 Originally, officer pretext was considered unlawful in

91. Id. at 148.
92. Id. at 148–49 (citing Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State
Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597 (1999); David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A
Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 96–109
(1998); Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Towards a State Constitutional
Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment’s Outer Frontier: A
Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1025 (1996)).
93. Id. at 150–55.
94. Id. at 155–56.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 156–57.
97. See generally Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1630 (2006) (discussing the
Rehnquist Court’s approach to constitutional criminal procedure). “The new
revolution deals with what happens in court, not on the street; it is concerned
with regulating lawyers and judges, not police officers; and, with a minor
qualification, it is indifferent to—that is, treats as not a matter relevant to its
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Alaska.98 Since 2005, the Alaska Court of Appeals has consistently
applied the “reasonable officer standard.” However, the reason the court
adopted this standard over alternatives is unclear.
1.

Pre–Whren Cases

McCoy v. State99 is one of the earliest reported cases where the
Alaska Supreme Court expressed its distaste for pretext legal
justifications.100 McCoy defines the permissible circumstances for
initiating a lawful search incident to arrest.101 The court condemned
using an arrest for the pretext desire to search the individual or area in
his immediate control for evidence of criminality.102 In McCoy, the court
also limited these searches to a search for destructible or concealable
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made because this would
remove the “danger of a pretext arrest.”103
Brown v. State104 is another 1970s case addressing pretext issues, and
perhaps the first involving a pretext traffic stop argument. In Brown, an
officer responded to a reported burglary of a liquor store and saw a
vehicle leaving the general area.105 The officer observed the vehicle make
several traffic violations.106 The officer decided to stop the vehicle,107
and, while he was pulling the car over, he received a description (of
person, clothes, and weapon) of the robbery suspect from dispatch.108
When Brown got out of the car, the officer saw that his description
matched that of the robbery suspect.109 The officer ordered Brown to lie
on the ground and as he approached Brown he looked into the car and
saw a jacket and weapon inside that matched the dispatcher’s report.110

concerns—the way the criminal justice system meshes with racial inequality in
the United States.” Id.
98. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 138 (“The arrest must not be a pretext for the search; a search
incident to a sham arrest is not valid.”).
101. See id. (proffering a list of requirements for a valid search).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 139.
104. 580 P.2d 1174 (Alaska 1978).
105. Id. at 1175.
106. Id. The officer noticed the vehicle bouncing erratically, which led him to
believe the vehicle was speeding. Id. The officer also observed the vehicle
turning without stopping at the intersection or signaling. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Brown was arrested, convicted, and then appealed.111 He argued
the evidence used to convict him was obtained through an unlawful
pretext traffic stop.112 The Alaska Supreme Court stated that, while “[i]t
[was] true that an arrest (or a traffic stop) should not be used as a pretext
for a search,” there was substantial evidence to show that Brown’s
vehicle was stopped for the observed traffic violations and was not a
pretext stop.113 There was no evidence in the record that the officer
harbored a subjective intent that differed from his stated reasons for the
stop,114 and nothing suggested that he had fabricated the traffic
observations he relied upon as the reasoning for the stop.115
In Brown, the court never clearly announced the specific standard it
was using to evaluate this pretext claim. But, by expressly condemning
pretext traffic stops and commenting on the lack of any evidence in the
record to suggest the officer had ulterior motives for this vehicle stop,116
it appeared that the court applied the subjective standard.
The court of appeals relied upon Brown ten years later in Townsel v.
State,117 which involved another alleged pretext traffic stop.118 Like
Brown, this case involved a robbery where the defendant argued a traffic
stop was used as a pretext to search for evidence of the robbery,119 and
again the court focused on the officer’s subjective motivations for the
stop.120 In Townsel, an Anchorage officer responded to a liquor store
robbery.121 Upon arrival, the officer contacted the victim who described
the suspect as a “juvenile black male between the ages of 16-20,
approximately 5’6”-5’7” and 130-140 pounds with black hair and brown
eyes” and that the suspect had fled the area on foot carrying a rifle.122
Another officer on duty near the area overheard the dispatch call and

111. Id. at 1176.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Experience and common police practice suggest otherwise. However,
without this type of testimony in the record it was impossible to determine that
this was a pretext stop without making an unsupported inference from the
proximity of the burglary report and the traffic stop.
115. Brown, 580 P.2d at 1176.
116. Id.
117. 763 P.2d 1353 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
118. Id. at 1354–55.
119. Id. at 1355.
120. See id. (“Officer Rochford testified that he stopped the vehicle for the
traffic and vehicular infractions, not on a pretext to enable him to investigate the
robbery. He testified that he would have made this stop under normal
conditions if he was not investigating the robbery.”).
121. Id. at 1354.
122. Id.
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observed a vehicle driving near that area.123 The officer observed several
vehicle violations including speeding, missing headlight, and a cracked
tail light lens.124 Based on these vehicle infractions, the officer stopped
the vehicle and ordered the driver out of the car.125 As the driver was
exiting the car, the officer observed the muzzle of a rifle in the back seat,
drew his duty weapon, and ordered the driver not to touch it.126 At that
point the driver grabbed the rifle, threw it to the ground, and ran from
the scene.127 The suspect escaped, but subsequent search warrants for
the suspect’s car and home led to his arrest and conviction for the
robbery of the liquor store.128
Arguing that the evidence brought against him was obtained as the
result of a traffic stop that was used as a pretext for a search, the
defendant cited Brown v. State as the leading Alaska case to condemn
pretext stops.129 The newly established Alaska Court of Appeals
addressed this argument by noting that, while Brown does establish that
“‘an arrest (or a traffic stop) should not be used as a pretext for a
search,’” it also supports the idea that “where ‘there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s determination that [the defendant’s]
vehicle was stopped for a violation of traffic regulations and that [the
stop] was not a pretext stop’ then the stop was not illegal.”130 Here, the
officer testified that he stopped the vehicle for the traffic and vehicular
infractions, not on a pretext to enable him to investigate the robbery.131
Further, he testified that he would have made this stop under normal
conditions if he was not investigating the robbery,132 which would
justify his stop under the subjective test. Based on this testimony, which
the trial court found to be credible, the Alaska Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction because this was not a situation involving
pretext.133
At this point in the development of Alaska case law, however,
change was on the horizon regarding the impact of subjective intentions
on the legality of pretext traffic stops. In 1992, the Alaska Court of

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1355.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176
(Alaska 1978)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Again, common sense and the proximity of the dispatch call and this
traffic stop suggests otherwise.
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Appeals discussed the effect of an officer’s subjective intentions for
making an investigative stop in dicta in the case of Beauvois v. State.134
The defendant robbed a convenience store in Fairbanks and fled on foot
towards a campground.135 The store clerk alerted the authorities, and a
responding officer decided to check the nearby campground.136 The
officer observed a car leaving the campground, and stopped the
vehicle.137 One passenger, who matched the description of the robber,
alighted from the vehicle.138 A license plate check also indicated the
vehicle was reported stolen, and a check of the driver’s identity
indicated she had been reported missing.139 A third person was found
hiding under a blanket in the backseat.140 The store clerk reported to the
scene and confirmed that the man in the back seat, Beauvois, was the
person who had just robbed the store.141
At an evidentiary hearing, Beauvois argued the stop of the car
violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska
Constitution because there was not a sufficient legal justification for this
investigatory stop.142 The trial judge denied the defendants’ Motion to
Suppress, holding that under the facts of this case it was permissible to
stop any potential witnesses found in this particular area. The court of
appeals agreed.143 But, instead of stopping at the holding, the court also
stated that the officer’s subjective motivation for the stop would be
irrelevant because under these facts the officer could have objectively
stopped vehicles in this area for the purpose of identifying potential
witnesses.144
This case demonstrates that the Alaska Court of Appeals was
willing to adopt an objective standard for pretext stops as early as 1992.
At this point in time, the United States Supreme Court had not
definitively announced whether such a standard was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.
134. 837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
135. Id. at 1119–20.
136. Id. at 1120.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1121–22.
144. Id. at 1121 n.1. At an evidentiary hearing the officer admitted his intent
was to stop the car to check for the robbery suspect and not to conduct a
witness-type inquiry. However, the court of appeals stated “[the officer’s]
subjective intent when he stopped the car is irrelevant. The test is whether,
under the facts known to the police officer, the stop of the car was objectively
justified.” Id.
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The Alaska Court of Appeals next addressed pretext traffic stops in
Combs v. Anchorage145 in 1994. While this case is an unpublished opinion
with no precedential effect, it is still instructive regarding the appellate
court’s approach to these cases during this era.146
In Combs, the defendant pled no contest to driving while
intoxicated and on a revoked license, but reserved the right to appeal the
legality of the initial traffic stop which he asserted was based on
pretext.147 In this case police received a report that a woman was seen
being thrown from a vehicle in the parking lot of a grocery store.148 The
report included a description of the vehicle, license plate number, and
description of the vehicle’s occupants and the victim.149 The responding
officer found no one in the area matching the descriptions.150 Forty
minutes later, another officer, who had heard the earlier dispatch report,
saw a car matching that description try to make a U-turn on a business
district roadway in that same general area.151 The vehicle had to back up
to complete the turn, which caused the officer to apply his brakes and
allow the vehicle to move out of the way.152 The officer saw that the
license plate number matched that of the report.153 The officer followed
the car for about half a mile before stopping it.154 The officer discovered
the driver, Combs, was intoxicated and arrested him.155
The trial judge found that the officer had observed Combs commit
two traffic violations, but that the primary motivation for this stop was
to investigate the earlier reported assault.156 Despite these findings the
trial judge concluded that an officer probably would have stopped a
vehicle attempting an illegal U-turn directly in front of him even in the
absence of the earlier dispatch report.157 Therefore, the stop was upheld
as valid.158
On appeal, Combs argued that the stop was illegal pretext based on
the judge’s findings that (a) the traffic violations were not the actual

145. No. A-5157, 1994 WL 16196676, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1994).
146. Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See
ALASKA R. APP. P. 214(d).
147. Combs, 1994 WL 16196676, at *1–2.
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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motivation for the stop and (b) there was no reasonable suspicion to
support the actual motivation for the stop.159 Combs referred the Court
to two cases from other jurisdictions holding that a traffic stop will not
be valid when made with an invalid motivation, unless a reasonable
police officer would have made the stop for the observed traffic
violation even without the invalid motivation.160 However, the court
concluded that it did not need to decide whether or not to adopt this
reasonable officer standard because even under that standard Combs’s
stop would be legal given the trial court’s findings.161 The
conviction
was affirmed.162
While not a reported case, Combs remains important, and we
believe influential, in the court’s future approach to pretext traffic stops.
Because the court did not choose to proactively adopt the reasonable
officer standard, it suggests that, prior to this case, the reasonable officer
standard did not govern pretext situations and that courts were still
applying the subjective standard.163 This case might also explain what
turned the focus of the court of appeals to other jurisdictions’ use of the
reasonable officer standard—the defendant, Combs, may have argued
for the reasonable officer standard because he was familiar with the
dicta from the court of appeals just two years earlier which suggested a
willingness to adopt a wholly objective standard, a standard most
detrimental to defendants.
2.

Post-Whren Cases

Since the United States Supreme Court decided Whren in 1996 the
Alaska Court of Appeals has been presented with many pretext stop
arguments. In Hamilton v. State,164 the court of appeals, in dicta, cited
favorably the objective standard that had been applied by other courts
pursuant to Whren.165 Three years later, in Nease v. State,166 the court
went further and began to employ the reasonable officer standard.167 In

159. Id. at *2.
160. Id. Interestingly, the defendant did not need to argue precedent from
other jurisdictions. See id. (holding that the question of what doctrine to adopt
did not need to be decided at that time).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. (declining to adopt the reasonable officer standard because it
would make no difference on the facts of this case).
164. 59 P.3d 760 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
165. Id. at 904; Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 765–66.
166. 105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
167. See id. at 1149 (“[T]he question is whether Officer Torok departed from
reasonable police practice . . . .”).
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doing so, the court of appeals offered no explanation for resorting to a
standard that appears inconsistent with pre- and post-Whren Alaska case
law. Yet, the reasonable officer standard used in Nease has been
continuously followed up until the present time.168
Hamilton involved a defendant who was convicted of murder and
appealed his conviction by arguing that the evidence used in his
conviction was derived from an unlawful pretext stop.169 A responding
officer saw a sedan driving away from the area of a reported stabbing.170
That officer radioed another officer to follow the car and record the
license plate number for later questioning as a possible witness.171 The
vehicle’s license plate was obscured by snow and could not be read, so
the officer stopped the vehicle and approached it.172 After brushing off
the snow and reporting the number to her superiors, the officer
approached the driver’s window and observed Hamilton with bloody
hands.173 Hamilton was arrested and the majority of the evidence
presented at trial was located at that time.174
Hamilton argued the obscured license plate was not the actual
motivation for the stop, which made the stop an illegal pretext.175 The
State offered two justifications for this stop.176 First, it was a violation of
the traffic laws to have an obscured license plate, and the stop could be
justified on that ground.177 Second, the stop was a permissible
investigative stop to inquire whether the occupant was a witness to the
reported crime.178 The court of appeals agreed with both of the
prosecution’s arguments.179 Following its dicta in Beauvois, the court
held that the legality of this investigative stop hinged on an “objective
test: whether the facts known to the officers established a legitimate
basis for the stop.”180 The court further stated that “the officers’
subjective theories as to why the stop was proper [were] irrelevant.”181

168. Marley v. State, No. A–9285, 2006 WL 1195668, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 3, 2006); Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005);
Olson v. State, No. A–8595, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20,
2005).
169. Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 764.
170. Id. at 763.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 764.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 767.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 765.
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Yet, the court of appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of this
standard, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Whren,
finding the stop was justified because the driver was a possible witness
to a crime and prompt investigation was a matter of practical
necessity.182 In other words, this case involved no pretext justification
because the actual motivation was permissible under the law.183
In Nease v. State, the court stopped signaling favor of the objective
standard and instead applied the reasonable officer standard.184 The
reasonable officer standard is defined as whether a reasonable officer
following normal police practice would have made the seizure in the
absence of illegitimate motivation.185 In Nease, a Juneau police officer
was on patrol in the early morning when he observed Nease’s red
pickup truck parked at a local bar.186 The officer had recently tried to
make a lawful arrest of the truck’s presumed driver for driving under
the influence,187 but continued his patrol after seeing the truck at the
bar.188 One hour later, the officer observed Nease’s pickup truck in the
parking lot of a nearby restaurant.189 He then saw the truck leave the
parking lot and pull onto the Glacier Highway.190 The officer began to
follow Nease.191 The officer observed no problems with Nease’s driving;
however, when Nease came to a stop, the officer observed that one of
Nease’s brake lights was not working.192 He stopped Nease and
determined he was intoxicated.193 Nease successfully moved to suppress
182. Id. at 766–67.
183. Id. Similarly, in Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004),
the defendant argued for the adoption of the subjective standard used in
Washington state because of Alaska’s heightened constitutional protections.
However, the court of appeals concluded it was not a pretext stop and there was
no concern about any ulterior subjective motivations the officer may have had,
so did not decide the issue. Id.
184. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
185. This is the definition applied in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Desai,
supra note 6, at 243 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.
1986); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994)).
186. Nease, 105 P.3d at 1146.
187. Id. On an earlier occasion, Officer Torok had observed Nease speeding
75 miles per hour in snowy conditions. Id. When Officer Torok caught up with
Nease, he was already out of his truck and denied driving. Id. During the stop,
Officer Torok observed that Nease “could barely walk” and “reeked of alcohol,”
and he suspected that Nease had been driving while intoxicated. Id. Yet, Nease
was not arrested because he could not definitively be identified as the driver of
the vehicle. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1146–47.
193. Id. at 1147.
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the evidence seized as a result of this stop by arguing the broken brake
light was a pretext to investigate him for drunk driving.194 The trial
judge believed he would not have been stopped except for the officer’s
subjective motivation to investigate the DUI.195
The State filed a petition for review to the superior court arguing
that the wrong standard was applied.196 The superior court agreed,
remanded the case, and directed the district court, quoting Beauvois, to
determine “whether, under the facts known to the police officer, the stop
of the car was objectively justified.”197 When the matter came before the
court of appeals,198 Nease argued that his stop was illegal because it was
made on subjectively pretextual grounds.199 He argued the officer did
not stop him for a broken taillight, but rather because he was suspicious
that Nease might be driving while intoxicated.200 Nease argued that “the
Alaska Constitution forbids the police from using a traffic infraction as a
pretext to stop a motorist for an offense for which the police do not have
enough individualized suspicion to justify a stop.”201 Nease
acknowledged that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Whren, the officer’s motivations for the stop were considered
irrelevant.202 But, he argued that the Alaska courts should adopt the
subjective standard that the Washington Supreme Court did in Ladson.203
The court of appeals found sufficient evidence in the record that the
officer had observed a traffic code violation.204 Nease was thus not
entitled to suppression of evidence even if the traffic violation was a
pretext for stopping the defendant for driving while intoxicated.205 The
court again said it was unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the
standard in Whren or to adopt the standard in Ladson as a matter of state
law.206 It based this decision on the fact that Nease failed to allege
sufficient facts to bring the traffic stop within the doctrine of pretext
stops.207 To explain, the court of appeals turned to a popular treatise on

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121 n.1
(Alaska Ct. App. 1992)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1148.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1150.
206. Id. at 1148.
207. Id.
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pretext stops to explain that “whether a police officer may have an
ulterior motive for enforcing the law is irrelevant for Fourth
Amendment purposes—even under the doctrine of pretext searches—
unless the defendant proves that this ulterior motive prompted the
officer to depart from reasonable police practices.”208 The court
subsequently chose to apply the reasonable officer standard.209
Since Nease, the court of appeals has consistently applied the
reasonable officer standard in every case involving a question of
whether an officer engaged in a pretext stop.210 In Olson v. State, for
example, reasonable police practice is defined broadly.211 After noting
that, in deciding pretext claims, the reasonable officer standard focuses
on the issue of whether or not the law enforcement officer departed
from reasonable police practices, the court found that Olson presented
“no evidence to suggest that police officers never stop motorists to issue
citations for equipment violations, or that they would never do so . . . .”212
It is difficult to imagine any pretext traffic stop that meets this burden,
and consequently it has nearly the same effect as the objective standard.
On several occasions criminal defendants have challenged the use
of pretext stops and urged the Alaska courts to declare that these stops
violate the Alaska Constitution. By deciding that pretext only occurs
when the police activity falls outside of common police custom or
practice—even if the stated reason for the stop was merely used to allow
investigation into other matters—the court of appeals has shielded
review of this important issue. While the court may ultimately decide
that the reasonable officer standard best balances competing interests
and respects the Alaska Constitution, it has yet to explain its reasoning.

II. THE REASON FOR PRETEXT IN MODERN POLICING
To fully understand the best legal standard to apply to pretext
stops, it is important to consider the purpose of these stops and why
they are part of established police practice. This section examines how
the law enforcement system (including the legislative branch, the

208. Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4, at 115–25 (3d ed. 1996)).
209. Id. at 1149–50.
210. See Marley v. State, No. A–9285, 2006 WL 1195668, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 3, 2006) (applying the reasonable officer standard); Grohs v. State, 118
P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (applying the reasonable officer
standard); Olson v. State, No. A–8595, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App.
July 20, 2005) (applying the reasonable officer standard).
211. Olson, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3.
212. Id. at *3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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executive branch, and various levels of law enforcement bureaucracy)
responds to limits placed on its powers to investigate and enforce the
law.
Law enforcement officials are closely tied to both political leaders
who respond to broad-based social demands and to victims of crime
who make specific pleas for vigorous enforcement. These social and
political forces cause officers to use creative strategies that reasonably
bridge the gap between these demands and the strict procedural
requirements imposed by the courts. One of the major ways in which
police respond to new legal constraints is to adopt proxy strategies. Very
basically, officers employ proxy strategies when they use the
investigation of one crime or activity as an opportunity to investigate
other crimes unrelated (or only very generally related) to the crime
under immediate investigation. For example, officers often link
seemingly benign public activity with more covert crimes, such as
associating the purchase of diet pills, red phosphorus, and high thread
count fabrics with the manufacture of methamphetamine. In this
example, a crime that is difficult to investigate in private spaces is
replaced with a proxy that routinely occurs in public spaces but which
may not be illegal absent its connection to an illegal act occurring in
private spaces.
Pretext stops are a different form of proxy. This practice is a useful
law enforcement tool because police can stop and observe suspects that
they may not have been able to detain absent the observed violation.
Because of the difficulty of observing many types of criminal activity,
officers capitalize on opportunities that present themselves to further
their crime control role in society.
While courts are expected to manage an adversarial system in
consideration of the accused person’s rights, law enforcement routinely
deals with victims who demand results. On the one hand, law
enforcement empathizes with the plight of victims. Law enforcement
may even feel that suspects are behaving in predatory ways, thus
officers may feel a need to protect potential victims. Officers may feel
some need to target predators. In any case, victims place direct and
indirect demands on the law enforcement system. These demands, if
unfulfilled, often result in appeals to the political system, but may also
result in appeals to the press.
It hardly matters whether the press is critical or supportive of law
enforcement. Positive reports of officers’ attempts to control crime
probably encourage the law enforcement response, while negative
reports may result in redoubled efforts to improve public perception.
There are also periods where the press becomes a direct influence on
public policy, including severe cases where the press contributes to a
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moral panic.213
Thus, in evaluating law enforcement systems, one must consider
various influences including the macro demands of the political system,
the micro demands of victims, and the impacts of the press. These
influences generate significant political pressure on law enforcement
systems.214
The “art of policing” is shorthand for the effort of officers and
others to devise appropriate responses to the competing pressures on
their job. This “art” incorporates discretion, intuitive investigation, and
the “spirit of the law” that may be difficult to define and defend solely
under strict procedural standards. On this view, officers engage in a
complicated mental exercise that accounts for various social demands
while also being mindful of reigning legal precedent and potential
future court decisions. Officers learn to stack layers of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, and other intuitive quasi-evidence and to
anticipate defenses for the investigative acts that they undertake.
Officers employ complex reasoning that attempts to simultaneously
access “artistic” processes of policing while also navigating the
requirements of procedure.

III. OBJECTIONS TO PRETEXT
Two major arguments, often discussed in tandem, against the use
of pretext stops emerge in the court decisions and other literature on the
topic.215 First, some argue that pretext stops make it impossible for
courts to enforce the legal constraints on policing imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. Second, pretext stops allow officers to conceal evidence of
impermissible race-based stops. The first argument was raised by the
defendants in Whren v. United States216 and accepted by the courts in
State v. Ladson,217 and State v. Ochoa,218 discussed in Section One. Some

213. ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 88–108 (2009).
214. Id.
215. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 733 (describing how the
Fourth Amendment no longer applies while driving a car and how those
stopped because of race have little recourse).
216. 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“Since, [defendants] contend, the use of
automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost
invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This
creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law
violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists.”).
217. 979 P.2d 833, 838 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he problem with a
pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search or seizure which cannot be
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courts, like the Supreme Court of Washington, find accepting pretext a
problematic deviation from the bedrock standards set forth in their
constitutional law that require probable cause and a warrant to search
and seize individuals unless they fall within a narrow set of
exceptions.219 This reasoning suggests that police should not do things
under the guise of fabricated legal justifications if they could not do
them when acting solely on the basis of their underlying intent.
This was the historical approach to pretext in New York as well.220
New York’s pre-Whren decisions applied a series of factors to determine
the existence of alternative intentions of officers, and, if pretext was
found, suppress any evidence gathered on this basis.221 Even after
Whren, some New York courts continued to follow the subjective factors
approach. One court succinctly explained the problem it saw with
pretext:
We also cannot blind ourselves to the dangers inherent in
according the police the discretion that Whren seems to permit.
If, in fact, the subjective intent of police officers is not to be
considered in the face of a credited traffic violation, then we
have effectively eliminated the decades-old protection against
stops based upon whim, caprice, idle curiosity, hunch, or gut
reaction.
More troubling still, the inability to look past a proffered
broken taillight or speed violation precludes exploration of
malevolent motives, such as stops based upon racial

constitutionally justified for its true reason (i.e., speculative criminal
investigation), but only for some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code) which
is at once lawfully sufficient but not the real reason. Pretext is therefore a
triumph of form over substance; a triumph of expediency at the expense of
reason.”).
218. 206 P.3d 143, 149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“We are not persuaded that the
distinction made by the United States Supreme Court is meaningful in the
context of a pretextual traffic stop. In performing a pretextual traffic stop, a
police officer is stopping the driver, ‘not to enforce the traffic code, but to
conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving. Therefore the
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred which
justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop
does not justify a stop for criminal investigation.’ Although there may be a
technical violation of the traffic law, the true reason for the stop lacks legal
sufficiency.”) (quoting Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837–38).
219. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 838–39; see supra Section I.B and accompanying
discussion.
220. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 734–35. This also was the early
approach of Alaska. See supra Section I.C.1 and accompanying discussion.
221. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 734–38.
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profiling.222
The final portion of this quotation suggests a related argument that
arises in the literature on this topic: the idea that making officers’
subjective motivations irrelevant under Fourth Amendment analysis
prevents courts from detecting and addressing race-based policing.223
Race-based policing has been the subject of numerous court cases,
news reports, empirical studies, and legal commentary. As one
commentator puts the point, “[f]ew issues are more important to
American policing than race.”224 Race-based policing, often referred to
as “racial profiling,” is described as a practice whereby officers routinely
make law enforcement decisions, such as the decision to stop an
individual, solely on the basis of a citizen’s race or ethnicity.225 “Hard
profiling” occurs when police use race as the only factor in assessing
criminal suspiciousness, while “soft profiling” occurs when officers use
race as one factor among others in determining criminal
suspiciousness.226 At their core, both definitions hinge upon an officer’s
prejudicial assumption that members of some racial or ethnic group are
more likely than others to engage in criminal behavior. Not all uses of
racial information fall into these definitions. For example, even ardent
opponents of racial profiling consider it appropriate to use race or
ethnicity as one of several identifiers of a known suspect to make an

222. Id. at 742 (quoting People v. Dickson, 690 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1998)).
223. See Capers, supra note 5, at 12 (“Here, the fact that our current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence now fosters an atmosphere in which racial profiling
is often unremarkable and juridically tolerated, and in which racial minorities
perceive themselves to be second-class citizens, evidences the current Court’s
retreat from concerns about equality and citizenship.”); Abramovsky &
Edelstein, supra note 7, at 733 (“In practical terms, an officer’s subjective
motivation in conducting a traffic stop can no longer be the subject of federal
constitutional inquiry . . . .”); Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644, 647–48
(relating contemporary public perceptions of racial profiling in police pretext
stops in light of Whren and its progeny). See also Desai, supra note 6, at 236
(noting potentially discriminatory uses of pretextual stops).
224. BRIAN L. WITHROW, THE WICHITA STOP STUDY, Acknowledgements (2002);
see generally Capers, supra note 5 (discussing how most of our criminal rules of
procedure have developed out of the need to protect racial minorities from
abusive processes and the Supreme Court’s concern for equal protection).
225. WITHROW, supra note 226, at 4. See Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[The U.S. Department of Justice states that]
racial profiling is any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or
national origin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that
leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or
having been, engaged in criminal activity.”).
226. WITHROW, supra note 226, at 4.
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enforcement decision regarding that individual.227
Racial profiling is not merely paranoia or the late penalty flag
thrown by a guilty defendant; rather, several studies on racial profiling
indicate minority groups are stopped and searched at
disproportionately high rates. 228 Researchers analyzing vehicle stop and
search statistics from the Boston Police Department discovered that 43%
of all vehicle searches were of black motorists even though they
comprised only 33% of all the cars stopped by police.229 In four major
cities in Ohio, statistics showed that blacks were twice as likely to be
stopped by police as non-blacks.230 Statistics in San Diego, California
showed black and Hispanic drivers were overrepresented in vehicle
stops. In that study, blacks were nearly 60% more likely to be stopped
and Hispanics 37% more likely to be stopped than white drivers.231 A
report from the Maryland State Police showed that during the period of
examination blacks comprised 72.9% of the drivers stopped and
searched along a major interstate although they comprised only 17.5% of
227. Id.; see Brian R. Jones, Bias-Based Policing in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REV. 925,
926–27 (2011) (arguing that the focus is too much on race and not on the root
problem of “bias-based policing”).
228. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 5, at 14–19 (relating statistical results of
studies done in Maryland, New York City, and by the ACLU indicating the
disproportionate frequency and thoroughness of traffic stop and search
protocols among minorities); Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644–46 (discussing
the results of one study where 90% of blacks believed that racial profiling was
pervasive nationwide, substantiated by a second “windshield study” revealing
that along the New Jersey Turnpike black motorists constituted 13.5% of all
drivers, 15% of those exceeding the speed limit, but 46% of those stopped by the
State Police); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544,
561–63 (1997) (analyzing a case study performed in Florida where minority
drivers made up 5% of the population commuting on I-95, but represented more
than 70% of all recorded stops during the study); R. Richard Banks, Beyond
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2003)
(summarizing a multi-jurisdictional study including federal and state law
enforcement that concluded there is a disproportionate investigation of blacks
and latinos, even in jurisdictions that prohibit racial profiling); WITHROW, supra
note 226, at 5–7 (indicating through a conglomeration of studies the heightened
and disproportionate frequency at which minority drivers are stopped by the
police); NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., RESULTS OF THE MONITORING OF WSP TRAFFIC
STOPS FOR BIASED POLICING: ANALYSIS OF WSP STOP, CITATION, SEARCH AND USE OF
FORCE DATA AND RESULTS OF THE USE OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES FOR
DENOMINATOR ASSESSMENT, 1, 4, 15–16 (2007) (demonstrating that various
Washington state trooper activities result in a population-proportionate amount
of self-initiated contact with whites and minorities via collisions, break-downs,
etc., but, there is a disproportionate number of minorities stopped for
violations).
229. Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 643.
230. Id. at 643–44.
231. Id. at 644.
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the drivers violating traffic laws.232 These black motorists were also
searched more frequently, despite the fact that the rate at which
contraband was found was statistically identical to that for whites.233
Statistics reviewed by the ACLU confirm the disproportionate
impact racial profiling has on law abiding minorities.234 Data collected in
Los Angeles, California showed that the stop rate was 3,400 stops higher
per 10,000 residents for blacks than whites, and 350 stops higher for
Hispanics than whites.235 This data indicated that police were 127%
more likely to search stopped blacks than stopped whites and 43% more
likely to search stopped Hispanics than whites.236 Yet, blacks were
actually 37% less likely to be found with weapons and 23% less likely to
be found with drugs than whites who were searched.237 Similar numbers
were found for Hispanics.238
Researchers note that evidence of disparities along racial or ethnic
lines does not necessarily offer definitive proof of race-based policing
because police discretion is complicated, dynamic, and reactive. To
understand the results of police decisions we must also understand the
process by which these decisions are made. Few, if any, data sets can
document this process.239 Legal professionals have been less cautious
about providing commentary about the cause and effect relationship of
these numbers and the police discrimination.240
Regardless of whether police bias against certain groups is real or
imagined, the perception that police target minorities still persists.241 A
2009 CNN poll showed that 56% of blacks believe they have been
treated unfairly by police because of their race and 46% believe that
police racism against blacks is “very common.”242 Only 11% of whites
share this same view.243 The recent turmoil regarding Arizona’s attempts

232. Capers, supra note 5, at 14–15.
233. Id. at 15.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 15–16.
239. WITHROW, supra note 226, at 9.
240. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 5, at 14 (“Here, the numbers are the
argument.”).
241. See id. at 2 (footnotes omitted) (observing that “[e]ven when racial
animus is absent, the perception that racial bias is present, or even inevitable
often persists”).
242. Id. at 14–15.
243. Id. 2013 polling statistics indicate that 61% of blacks surveyed believe the
U.S. justice system is biased against blacks, 70% believed they are treated less
fairly by the police, and 68% believed they were treated less fairly by the courts.
Race and Ethnicity, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/
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to pass the anti-illegal immigration Senate Bill 1070 also emphasizes this
prevailing belief among the Hispanic population.
Less evident, and perhaps entirely immeasurable, is the role pretext
stops play in the numbers and perceptions just described. While
expressly forbidding racially-motivated traffic stops,244 the United States
Supreme Court’s adoption of the objective standard is believed by some
to validate “one of the most common methods by which racial profiles
are put into effect—the pretext stop.”245 It is argued that this validation
causes a number of harms to minority citizens.246
Allowing pretext stops makes it extremely difficult for defendants
to challenge racial profiling in court. There are two primary ways of
pursuing such a challenge. The first is to argue selective prosecution, a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This requires showing that
members of the defendant’s racial or ethnic group are unfairly targeted
by law enforcement by proving systemic profiling through objective
evidence, such as statistics, that members of other races were not
prosecuted247 or that members of their racial group are being prosecuted
disproportionately.248 This argument requires more than just
highlighting individual instances of racially discriminatory conduct. It
requires showing patterns of discriminatory conduct. This requirement
forces defendants to look beyond their own cases to find extensive
factual evidence.249 Discovery of this type of evidence under applicable
criminal rules of procedure is extremely limited.250
The second way of challenging race-based policing is to attack it
directly as an illegal act of profiling.251 But here, racial profiling is
defined as an explicit policy of targeting individuals for investigation
because of their race.252 If a defendant proves the existence of such a
policy then there is no need to show statistical data showing they are
members of a group being targeted for enforcement.253 The policy shows
a direct connection between race and the search or seizure; such a policy
can only be used if it survives strict scrutiny analysis.254
Prior to Whren, a defendant claiming racial profiling did so through
race.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
244. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
245. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 726.
246. Capers, supra note 5, at 19–29.
247. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 729.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 730.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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a hearing.255 During these hearings, defendants could question officers
about whether the stop arose out of a particularized suspicion or was
based on pretext alone.256 Establishing pretext was helpful in showing
that unlawful considerations such as race factored into their decision to
make the stop.257 If courts adopt Whren’s purely objective standard for
pretext, an officer’s subjective intentions become irrelevant under Fourth
Amendment analysis and it prohibits the further questioning needed to
uproot individual cases of racially-motivated investigations.
The problems created by profiling are concerning and can be
exacerbated by the use of pretext. Thus, any decision Alaska makes
regarding pretext should include a careful review of these concerns and
how they can be mitigated.

IV. AN ALASKAN APPROACH
The time is overdue to explain why Alaska courts follow the
reasonable officer standard. Alaska courts should articulate how that
standard will actually work in individual cases and describe how it
honors Alaska’s constitutional provisions. In developing a standard,
Alaska courts should look beyond precedent, procedure, and the rule of
law, and instead incorporate additional perspectives related to the
benefits of pretext. While jurisprudence often makes precedent,
procedure, and the rule of law its primary concern, we argue that it
should incorporate additional perspectives based on police practice.
Only then can an Alaskan jurisprudence articulate an appropriate legal
standard consistent with the State’s constitutional protections against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The debate about the propriety of pretext stops is part of a much
larger ethical and philosophical dilemma facing our policymakers and
courts. As a society, we are constantly struggling to create policies that
balance the desire to protect the rights of all persons and the need to
infringe upon those freedoms and liberties to enhance collective public
safety goals. Some refer to this as a “value tradeoff” wherein society is
forced to emphasize one at the expense of the other.258
Irrespective of this need to strike an appropriate balance between
competing interests in our policies, we also face the harsh reality that we

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 733 (explaining how defendants no longer have a mechanism to
show racial motivation causing stops).
258. See MICHAEL C. BRASWELL ET AL., JUSTICE CRIME AND ETHICS 46–48 (7th ed.
2012) (discussing the weighing of competing values in a police context).
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lack the ability to control all the variables leading to disparate
enforcement. In few areas is this more observable than in our criminal
justice system. Social factors outside of the system’s control often
influence who is exposed to governmental observation, apprehension,
prosecution, and punishment. There are so many variables that
influence who becomes subject to prosecution that it is difficult to isolate
any one causal source of the disparate representation we see in our
statistics.
We are faced with this reality when we consider pretext. There is
real doubt that we will ever eradicate the use of pretext motivations
even if we were to prohibit them. We all make judgments and mental
shortcuts based on our past experiences and training. If we recognize
this fact, the question arises whether to prohibit pretext outright and
push its use further into the shadows or to pursue a policy that identifies
clear injustices and creates pragmatic solutions.259 As Marx famously
mused: philosophers interpret the world, but the point is to change it.260
As we have shown in the first section of this paper, other courts
across the nation have responded to the challenges of pretext stops with
a range of “reasonableness standards.” Perhaps in an effort to capture
universal values, some courts (such as those in Washington) have
adopted a “subjective standard.” This standard restricts officers’ use of
pretext stops by emphasizing what the officer intended before the stop.
If an officer intended to intervene in a dangerous driving incident, the
stop is allowed; but if the officer uses the same stop as a proxy to
investigate an unsupported suspicion that another crime might be afoot,
then the stop is not allowed. This standard seems to signal, even if only
in perception, that the court is protecting the most vulnerable.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Whren permits the use of pretext stops.261 In Whren, the Court recognized
that allowing examination of officers’ motives in detaining drivers
would open courts to an incredible workload and difficult questions.262
According to the Court, an officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant
as long as he could lawfully stop the driver for an observed traffic
violation.263 The Court concluded that pretext selectively used on certain
classes can be remedied elsewhere.264

259. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE vii (2009) (praising the identification
of redressable injustice even without trying to achieve a perfectly just world).
260. KARL MARX, THESES ON FEUERBACH § XI (1845).
261. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
262. Id. at 813–17.
263. Id. at 816–19.
264. Id.
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Yet, we have described how these other civil remedies are useless
to most criminal defendants who need a workable opportunity to show
inappropriate racial motivations in their cases through a suppression
hearing.265 The objective standard offers the police nearly unchecked
discretion, and the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards
relied on by Whren do not limit police from targeting certain types of
vehicle operators.266 Additionally, under this standard pretext can be
used to act on unsupported hunches by officers acting outside of
reasonable police practices. For these reasons, the standard runs afoul of
Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. The objective standard
prevents review of many police actions which may offend our notions of
justice—a review which is at the core of Article I, Section 14.
The reasonable officer standard strikes the appropriate balance
regarding competing interests and the realities of police work. Further, it
is in keeping with the tenets of Alaska’s Constitution. This standard
permits pretext stops that would have been made regardless of the
officer’s subjective motivations: for example, where the observed
violation poses an immediate safety threat or would otherwise require
immediate action by the officer. These are situations where the observed
violation poses an immediate safety threat to others or where the
officer’s typical duties would cause the officer to take immediate action.
Under this standard, defendants have the opportunity to reveal
“purely”267 or “classic”268 pretextual fishing expeditions for what they
are. They can also demonstrate instances where racial profiling is
motivating the stop without having to point to an official policy or
amass broader statistical proof. This standard allows judicial review of
the reasonableness of police seizures, which is the hallmark of Article I,
Section 14.
Alaska should continue to use the reasonable officer standard, but
should adjust its application of this standard to conform to other
jurisdictions like New Mexico. Alaska has traditionally used the
standard to decide whether a situation is classified as pretext. If the
traffic stop was within what would be expected of a reasonable officer in
that situation, irrespective of the fact that there were other subjective
motivations that could not have been independently acted upon, then
the court of appeals has concluded that the stop was not pretext. Other

265. See supra Part III.
266. State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
267. See State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 397–98 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (defining a
purely pretextual stop).
268. See Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 905 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (defining a
classic pretext search).
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jurisdictions candidly recognize that even in these situations there is an
element of pretext present, but test to see if it is a type they are willing to
accept. We urge Alaska to follow their lead. New Mexico has articulated
an application of the reasonable officer standard that provides a
workable test.269
New Mexico determines if a stop is based on pretextual subterfuge
by considering the totality of the circumstances, judging the credibility
of the witnesses, weighing the evidence, and excluding evidence if the
stop constitutes unreasonable pretext.270 The court uses a three part test:
1.
2.

3.

The court decides if there was reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to justify the traffic stop. The state bears this
burden.
If objectively reasonable on its face, but the defendant
contends it was pretextual, the court must decide whether the
officer’s true motivation for the stop differed from the
objective existence of the traffic violation. Here the defendant
has the burden of proof to show that under the totality of the
circumstances pretext motivated the stop. The defendant must
place substantial facts in dispute that indicate pretext.
If the defendant can establish the presence of a pretext
motivation for the stop it creates a rebuttable presumption
that the stop was impermissible pretext. The burden then
shifts to the state to show that based on the totality of the
circumstances, even without the unrelated motive, the officer
would have stopped the defendant for the traffic violation.271

The court considers a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the
burdens required in steps two and three. These include:











269.
270.
271.
272.

Whether the defendant was arrested for and charged with a
crime unrelated to the stop;
Whether the officer complied with standard police practices;
Whether the officer is in an unmarked patrol car or not in
uniform;
Whether patrolling or enforcement of the traffic code were
among the officer’s typical employment duties;
Whether the officer had information, not rising to the level of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, relating to another
offense;
The manner of the stop;
The conduct, demeanor, and statements of the officer during
the stop;
The relevant characteristics of the defendant;
Whether the objective reason articulated for the stop was
necessary to protect traffic safety; and
The officer’s testimony as to the reason for the stop.272

Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 155.
Id.
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 156.

MAY_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

188

11/27/2013 2:03 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 30:2

A standard, applied in this manner, preserves law enforcement’s
ability to use reasonable proxies in criminal investigation, to candidly
testify as to the presence of other subjective motivations, and to
demonstrate the reasonableness of their actions.
The only actions prohibited by this approach are those where
officers are seeking to use minor traffic violations to pursue hunches
without developed reasonable suspicion and probable cause. In
addition, this standard reduces the threshold for an individual to raise
an objection to a pretext stop that might be based upon prohibited
factors such as race or social classifications.
The New Mexico standard, if adopted in Alaska, would enable the
court to justify the reasonable officer standard in a manner consistent
with Alaska’s Constitution.

CONCLUSION
Alaska’s appellate courts have been asked on several occasions to
explain and defend the legalities of pretext stops. We conclude that
Alaska has informally adopted the correct standard, but urge some
changes to its application and clarification regarding why it is the best of
available alternatives.
This Article provides a review of the standards used, Alaska’s
historical treatment of pretext, policy, and practice considerations. We
provide an argument to justify the standard the court is currently using.
Furthermore, this Article provides arguments that the reasonable officer
standard balances all competing interests and encourages reasonable
and practical policing, while protecting the interests of Alaska’s citizens.

